The blast radius is narrower than the technique suggests however. There is no remote component, so the attacker must be physically at the keyboard and know the right combination of keys. The machine must also have at least one account linked to an online Microsoft account, because the reset flow that anchors the attack depends on it.
Devices running only local accounts are not affected.
“using a USB stick and physical access”
“Look I’m going to get past the guard with a toothpick and this gun I found”
it is bypassing the device encryption.
meaning if someone broke into your house (poli… ahm), they can access the data on your encrypted drive.
tbh i didn’t read the article, but security is important even locally.
…lives entirely inside… It requires no X, no Y and no Z. …sits between…
Is it really too much to ask that “journalists” write their own copy rather than have an LLM do it for them? It’s aggravating to read.
Yes, but how are they supposed to print the article 5 seconds earlier than the competition? /s
i don’t see that exact text
sounds false
The exploit, dubbed FastUnlock, lives entirely inside software that ships with Windows. It requires no malware download, no credential theft and no memory corruption bug. It is a logic flaw, an […]
The root of the problem sits between Narrator’s redesigned interface and the lock screen’s restricted account context.
Right from the first few paragraphs.
Though personally I don’t get much ai vibe from the quotes.
On linux I don’t have a pin, I don’t have an account, I start my PC and go directly to my OS…
Psychopaths forcing you to sign in, stealing your data, changing your “lock” and keeping the key without telling you is mindblowing.
This forced bullshit to know who is using the device at any moment is not needed for 90% of normal people. Keeping your data “safe” from people you live with by stealing and analysing it on their servers is a great security “feature” somehow but in reality it is a privacy feature that violates your privacy big time
As I don’t really understand the Windows and BitLocker architecture, could someone please clear my confusion? I thought that BitLocker was a full disk encryption feature with the decryption keys derived from the BitLocker password, or a potential cloud-based recovery that would require re-authentication with Microsoft. How could such a encryption be bypassed by just escaping the recovery flow?
The attack also starts from a lock screen, which means it targets drives BitLocker has already unlocked at boot, as the default TPM-only setup does. A startup PIN would likely stop an attacker before the lock screen ever loads, though that has not been tested.
Ah, so BitLocker just decrypts the drive using keys from TPM without a password required? That’s quite far on the convenience over security scale.
I would argue that this isn’t a BitLocker bypass so much as a classic login screen bypass, then.
In any case, thanks for the explanation
As someone who sets up laptops to go out to our workers: we have a Group Policy that forces all bitlockers to be a PIN variety; however you can absolutely set it up just to have the keys in the TPM and at that point the disk is encrypted but boots into Windows without ever asking for a PIN. That is basically useless as it only protects from the drive being taken out of the machine.
According to the article Windows has already retrieved the drive key from the TPM and decrypted the drive at the point the exploit is done.
The TPM architecture has always been fundamentally bad. More or less, these systems work by querying the TPM for the password and then pasting it into the password field. The way Linux does it is fundamentally flawed.
Edit: oh it’s just a window that lets you do stuff without logging in. I forgot Microsoft is that stupid now.
It does something very different than you’d naively expect, and is doing that just fine.
TPM just makes sure the code you run wasn’t manipulated/changed.Or commonly on other device categories to make sure the code the manufacturer put there wasn’t changed by you to give you access.
In either case, if there are bugs you can exploit without changing code, then you get the same access as the operating system.
So if you are on a shitty OS like microslops windoes you should set a password query as early as possible, since that minimizes the chances. Ideally using a bios password or a wrapper decrypting the disk before the OS loads at all. Since microslop keeps adding both stupid bugs in early boot, and also actual (presumed) backdoors in e.g. the recovery.Meanwhile on e.g. Linux, using TPM can essentially give you disk encryption protection but with the normal login screen and even multiple users.
That’s secure boot, not TPM.
When you hook it into disk encryption, it’s tpm.
Very much strongly related though.
Just like secureboot, things are checksummed, and the sum is then handed to tpm. Tpm will advance its state according to the things it is passed in this way. When it comes to decryption, the tpm will give out a key that depends on all those previous inputs.
If any step of the chain was different, the key will be different.
Of course, if you manage to exploit some of the boot process and take control without the component entering a new checksum, you can then add the remaining ones tpm would have normally gotten and get the unlock key.
Similar to secureboot, where you could then make it run any other code and execute any other .efi file without that being verified.Difference is that with just secureboot, if I put the disk in another system with secureboot disabled, or turn of secureboot in the bios, I can just run my own code.
But with tpm, if I put the disk in a different system the tpm there won’t have the same key.
And if I say disable secureboot then the bios would still checksum the first .efi binary, and if it matches then that would be programmed to checksum and submit the next, etc. so without any bugs in uefi I should be unable to insert my own boot file while not ruining the tpm state with the checksum of that file.
And of course disabling tpm would equally leave me without ability to get the key.When it comes to decryption, the tpm will give out a key that depends on all those previous inputs. If any step of the chain was different, the key will be different.
I thought TPMs worked more like RPMb? Isn’t the key physically stored in some memory region, but it just refuses to give it out unless the inputs are cryptographically correct?
I didn’t think it was re-deriving the Bitlocker key each time?
Must be physically present: Not a big deal.
Bitlocker only exists for physical access…
Remember employees of companies walking around with laptops, and having to go through TSA who have no issue stealing devices
It’s probably not an issue for your desktop, but physically present isn’t a get out of jail free card. Whether an attack matters depends on that machine’s threat model
Reminds me of the classic exploit of going to the help on the login page of Windows 98 or 2000 and from there launching anything you want. What is old is new again, I guess.
I’m not sure why the article talks about bitlocker, though, it’s not related to this in any way.
I remember there was a script you could run from a bootable floppy that would give you the local admin password for Windows 2000, then I’d use that to patch the Windows 2000 PCs in my high school lab so that it gave a fake ctrl-alt-del login, and keylogged all login entries to a local file. One day the teacher logged in, and I had his network admin. From there we got all the answers to the exams for the rest of the year. The class average was 97, and they gave us awards in the auditorium stage at the end of the year.
You deserved it
It was a computer engineering class so I guess we learned either way
It’s related in the sense that the drive was unlocked at boot and stays unlocked when the screen is locked. This allows then to copy files off the drive from the lock screen, whereas ideally the lock screen would be completely isolated and not able to access the user’s files.
I suspect it will be very difficult to actually fix that part, because you can get notifications and such on the lock screen, needing access to said files.
The lock screen is not really a security boundary. It’s a convenience at best. Once a system is booted into windows, it’s running all kinds of services that are exploitable over the network, too. And if you can log on as another user, you can exploit local services.
If you want to protect a system, enable full disk encryption with a strong password and shut it down. (Assuming there aren’t other vulnerabilities in bitlocker, again.)
I was just pointing out what relevance Bitlocker (a disk encryption system) had to do with anything. It’s mentioned in the article.
I’m not a security expert, but I presume that when that level is security is required, it would be possible to build such a system that does do a complete lockdown when the screen is locked. That wasn’t the subject of my comment, though.
This is like saying “if you want to have safe sex, put a condom on and never have sex.”
Devices should have ACLs in place at the file system level, be encrypted without proper credentials, and deny access from unspecified locations.
Deny all and allow only what’s specified.
windows is not trying to be an operating system anymore
it sounds like its trying to be a Ad serving software for microsoft
come on, we need to stop microsoft and later big tech
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